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The moral significance of being born

This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to... Full description

Journal Title: Journal of Medical Ethics 1 May 2013, Vol.39(5), p.326
Main Author: Levy, Neil
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
Publisher: BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
ID: ISSN: 0306-6800 ; E-ISSN: 1473-4257 ; DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100734 ; PMID: 23637446
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recordid: bmj_journals10.1136/medethics-2012-100734
title: The moral significance of being born
format: Article
creator:
  • Levy, Neil
subjects:
  • Abortion
ispartof: Journal of Medical Ethics, 1 May 2013, Vol.39(5), p.326
description: This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
language: eng
source:
identifier: ISSN: 0306-6800 ; E-ISSN: 1473-4257 ; DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100734 ; PMID: 23637446
fulltext: fulltext
issn:
  • 03066800
  • 14734257
  • 0306-6800
  • 1473-4257
url: Link


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descriptionThis paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
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titleThe moral significance of being born
descriptionThis paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
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abstractThis paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
pubBMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics
doi10.1136/medethics-2012-100734
urlhttp://jme.bmj.com/content/39/5/326.full.pdf
pmid23637446
pages326-329
date2013-05-01