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Lavish returns on cheap talk: Two-way communication in trust games

We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communi... Full description

Journal Title: The Journal of socio-economics 2011, Vol.40 (1), p.1-13
Main Author: Ben-Ner, Avner
Other Authors: Putterman, Louis , Ren, Ting
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
Cheap talk
Commitment
Communication
Content analysis
Game theory
Reciprocity
Studies
Trust
Trust game
Trust game Trust Trustworthiness Reciprocity Commitment Communication Cheap talk
Trustworthiness
Verbal communication
Publisher: Greenwich: Elsevier Inc
ID: ISSN: 1053-5357
Link: http://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeesoceco/v_3a40_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a1-13.htm
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recordid: cdi_crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2010_09_009
title: Lavish returns on cheap talk: Two-way communication in trust games
format: Article
creator:
  • Ben-Ner, Avner
  • Putterman, Louis
  • Ren, Ting
subjects:
  • Cheap talk
  • Commitment
  • Communication
  • Content analysis
  • Game theory
  • Reciprocity
  • Studies
  • Trust
  • Trust game
  • Trust game Trust Trustworthiness Reciprocity Commitment Communication Cheap talk
  • Trustworthiness
  • Verbal communication
ispartof: The Journal of socio-economics, 2011, Vol.40 (1), p.1-13
description: We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes. We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes.
language: eng
source:
identifier: ISSN: 1053-5357
fulltext: no_fulltext
issn:
  • 1053-5357
  • 1879-1239
url: Link


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descriptionWe conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes. We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes.
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subjectCheap talk ; Commitment ; Communication ; Content analysis ; Game theory ; Reciprocity ; Studies ; Trust ; Trust game ; Trust game Trust Trustworthiness Reciprocity Commitment Communication Cheap talk ; Trustworthiness ; Verbal communication
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abstractWe conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes. We conduct trust game experiments in which subjects can sometimes exchange proposals either in numerical (tabular) form, or using chat messages followed by exchange of numerical proposals. Numerical communication significantly increases trusting and trustworthiness; inclusion of 1-min verbal communication in a chat room generates an even larger and more robust effect. On average, trustors send $9.21 of their $10 endowment as compared to $7.66 in the standard trust game, and trustees return 56% vs. 45%. Chat enhances the likelihood that trustors and trustees will adhere to non-binding agreements they make—an additional interpretation of trusting and trustworthiness—and increases the probability that subjects will propose, accept, and abide by equal-division agreements. Analysis of the content of subjects’ verbal communication shows that what is said, and not only the fact that things are said, significantly affects outcomes.
copGreenwich
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doi10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.009