CHOICE AND EFFICIENCY IN A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC SEMI-COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURE

Examination focuses on the issue of voluntary agricultural collectivization when land can be allocated to either ''private'' or ''cooperative'' use by the socialist community and individuals or households may freely apportion their labor between these 2 sectors. A model of producers' behavior at the... Full description

Examination focuses on the issue of voluntary agricultural collectivization when land can be allocated to either ''private'' or ''cooperative'' use by the socialist community and individuals or households may freely apportion their labor between these 2 sectors. A model of producers' behavior at the levels of the household and the community is constructed; it is similar to the model of Putterman (1980, 1981). However, greater specification is given to expectations formation and equilibrium concepts and to mechanisms of adjustment from disequilibrium. In addition, solutions to the model are computed for specified production and utility functions. Assuming certainty, full information, equal access to land, and internal democracy, the theoretical analysis demonstrates that self-interested choice by farmers having the exclusive options of households and collective production effort and land allocation would result in relatively efficient outcomes.