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Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition

This paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are an upstream firm (a manufacturer) and many downstream firms (retailers). The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information. Verti... Full description

Journal Title: Management Science 2002-09-01, Vol.48 (9), p.1196-1212
Main Author: Li, Lode
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
Quelle: Alma/SFX Local Collection
Publisher: Linthicum: INFORMS
ID: ISSN: 0025-1909
Link: http://econpapers.repec.org/article/inmormnsc/v_3a48_3ay_3a2002_3ai_3a9_3ap_3a1196-1212.htm
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recordid: cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_39133754
title: Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition
format: Article
creator:
  • Li, Lode
subjects:
  • Business studies
  • Competition
  • Competition (Economics)
  • Confidentiality
  • Contracts
  • Duopolies
  • Economic aspects
  • Effects
  • Enterprises
  • Equilibrium prices
  • Information
  • Information management
  • Information resources management
  • Information sharing
  • Inventory
  • Logistics
  • Management science
  • Manufacturing output
  • Marginal costs
  • Mathematical methods
  • Mathematical models
  • Models
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Profitability
  • Retail stores
  • Retail trade
  • Studies
  • Suppliers
  • Supply
  • Supply chain management
  • Supply chains
ispartof: Management Science, 2002-09-01, Vol.48 (9), p.1196-1212
description: This paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are an upstream firm (a manufacturer) and many downstream firms (retailers). The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information. Vertical information sharing has two effects: "direct effect" due to the changes in strategy by the parties involved in sharing the information and "indirect effect" (or "leakage effect") due to the changes in strategy by other competing firms (who may infer the information from the actions of the informed parties). Both changes would affect the profitability of the firms. We show that the leakage effect discourages the retailers from sharing their demand information with the manufacturer while encouraging them to share their cost information. On the other hand, the direct effect always discourages the retailers from sharing their information. When voluntary information sharing is not possible, we identify conditions under which information can be traded and show how price should be determined to facilitate such information exchange. We also examine the impact of vertical information sharing on the total supply chain profits and social benefits.
language: eng
source: Alma/SFX Local Collection
identifier: ISSN: 0025-1909
fulltext: fulltext
issn:
  • 0025-1909
  • 1526-5501
url: Link


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descriptionThis paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are an upstream firm (a manufacturer) and many downstream firms (retailers). The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information. Vertical information sharing has two effects: "direct effect" due to the changes in strategy by the parties involved in sharing the information and "indirect effect" (or "leakage effect") due to the changes in strategy by other competing firms (who may infer the information from the actions of the informed parties). Both changes would affect the profitability of the firms. We show that the leakage effect discourages the retailers from sharing their demand information with the manufacturer while encouraging them to share their cost information. On the other hand, the direct effect always discourages the retailers from sharing their information. When voluntary information sharing is not possible, we identify conditions under which information can be traded and show how price should be determined to facilitate such information exchange. We also examine the impact of vertical information sharing on the total supply chain profits and social benefits.
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subjectBusiness studies ; Competition ; Competition (Economics) ; Confidentiality ; Contracts ; Duopolies ; Economic aspects ; Effects ; Enterprises ; Equilibrium prices ; Information ; Information management ; Information resources management ; Information sharing ; Inventory ; Logistics ; Management science ; Manufacturing output ; Marginal costs ; Mathematical methods ; Mathematical models ; Models ; Nash equilibrium ; Profitability ; Retail stores ; Retail trade ; Studies ; Suppliers ; Supply ; Supply chain management ; Supply chains
ispartofManagement Science, 2002-09-01, Vol.48 (9), p.1196-1212
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abstractThis paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are an upstream firm (a manufacturer) and many downstream firms (retailers). The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information. Vertical information sharing has two effects: "direct effect" due to the changes in strategy by the parties involved in sharing the information and "indirect effect" (or "leakage effect") due to the changes in strategy by other competing firms (who may infer the information from the actions of the informed parties). Both changes would affect the profitability of the firms. We show that the leakage effect discourages the retailers from sharing their demand information with the manufacturer while encouraging them to share their cost information. On the other hand, the direct effect always discourages the retailers from sharing their information. When voluntary information sharing is not possible, we identify conditions under which information can be traded and show how price should be determined to facilitate such information exchange. We also examine the impact of vertical information sharing on the total supply chain profits and social benefits.
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