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Evolution of restraint in a structured rock--paper--scissors community.(Author abstract)

It is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a... Full description

Journal Title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States June 28, 2011, Vol.108(26), p.10831(8)
Main Author: Nahum, Joshua R.
Other Authors: Harding, Brittany N. , Kerr, Benjamin
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
ID: ISSN: 0027-8424
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recordid: gale_ofa261318548
title: Evolution of restraint in a structured rock--paper--scissors community.(Author abstract)
format: Article
creator:
  • Nahum, Joshua R.
  • Harding, Brittany N.
  • Kerr, Benjamin
subjects:
  • Evolution (Biology) -- Research
  • Computer Simulation -- Research
ispartof: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, June 28, 2011, Vol.108(26), p.10831(8)
description: It is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a form of altruism. The cost of this kind of prudent behavior is that restrained individuals give up resources to less-restrained individuals. The benefit of restraint is that better resource management may prolong the persistence of the group. One way to dodge the problem of defection is for altruists to interact disproportionately with other altruists. With limited dispersal, restrained individuals persist because of interaction with like types, whereas it is the unrestrained individuals that must face the negative long-term consequences of their rapacity. Here, we study the evolution of restraint in a community of three competitors exhibiting a nontransitive (rock--paper--scissors) relationship. The nontransitivity ensures a form of negative feedback, whereby improvement in growth of one competitor has the counterintuitive consequence of lowering the density of that improved player. This negative feedback generates detrimental long-term consequences for unrestrained growth. Using both computer simulations and evolution experiments with a nontransitive community of Escherichia coli, we find that restrained growth can evolve under conditions of limited dispersal in which negative feedback is present. This research, thus, highlights a set of ecological conditions sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism. survival of the weakest | experimental evolution | positive assortment | ecological feedback | bacteriocin doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1100296108
language: English
source:
identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424
fulltext: fulltext
issn:
  • 0027-8424
  • 00278424
url: Link


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titleEvolution of restraint in a structured rock--paper--scissors community.(Author abstract)
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ispartofProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, June 28, 2011, Vol.108(26), p.10831(8)
identifierISSN: 0027-8424
subjectEvolution (Biology) -- Research ; Computer Simulation -- Research
descriptionIt is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a form of altruism. The cost of this kind of prudent behavior is that restrained individuals give up resources to less-restrained individuals. The benefit of restraint is that better resource management may prolong the persistence of the group. One way to dodge the problem of defection is for altruists to interact disproportionately with other altruists. With limited dispersal, restrained individuals persist because of interaction with like types, whereas it is the unrestrained individuals that must face the negative long-term consequences of their rapacity. Here, we study the evolution of restraint in a community of three competitors exhibiting a nontransitive (rock--paper--scissors) relationship. The nontransitivity ensures a form of negative feedback, whereby improvement in growth of one competitor has the counterintuitive consequence of lowering the density of that improved player. This negative feedback generates detrimental long-term consequences for unrestrained growth. Using both computer simulations and evolution experiments with a nontransitive community of Escherichia coli, we find that restrained growth can evolve under conditions of limited dispersal in which negative feedback is present. This research, thus, highlights a set of ecological conditions sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism. survival of the weakest | experimental evolution | positive assortment | ecological feedback | bacteriocin doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1100296108
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titleEvolution of restraint in a structured rock--paper--scissors community.(Author abstract)
descriptionIt is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a form of altruism. The cost of this kind of prudent behavior is that restrained individuals give up resources to less-restrained individuals. The benefit of restraint is that better resource management may prolong the persistence of the group. One way to dodge the problem of defection is for altruists to interact disproportionately with other altruists. With limited dispersal, restrained individuals persist because of interaction with like types, whereas it is the unrestrained individuals that must face the negative long-term consequences of their rapacity. Here, we study the evolution of restraint in a community of three competitors exhibiting a nontransitive (rock--paper--scissors) relationship. The nontransitivity ensures a form of negative feedback, whereby improvement in growth of one competitor has the counterintuitive consequence of lowering the density of that improved player. This negative feedback generates detrimental long-term consequences for unrestrained growth. Using both computer simulations and evolution experiments with a nontransitive community of Escherichia coli, we find that restrained growth can evolve under conditions of limited dispersal in which negative feedback is present. This research, thus, highlights a set of ecological conditions sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism. survival of the weakest | experimental evolution | positive assortment | ecological feedback | bacteriocin doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1100296108
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abstractIt is not immediately clear how costly behavior that benefits others evolves by natural selection. By saving on inherent costs, individuals that do not contribute socially have a selective advantage over altruists if both types receive equal benefits. Restrained consumption of a common resource is a form of altruism. The cost of this kind of prudent behavior is that restrained individuals give up resources to less-restrained individuals. The benefit of restraint is that better resource management may prolong the persistence of the group. One way to dodge the problem of defection is for altruists to interact disproportionately with other altruists. With limited dispersal, restrained individuals persist because of interaction with like types, whereas it is the unrestrained individuals that must face the negative long-term consequences of their rapacity. Here, we study the evolution of restraint in a community of three competitors exhibiting a nontransitive (rock--paper--scissors) relationship. The nontransitivity ensures a form of negative feedback, whereby improvement in growth of one competitor has the counterintuitive consequence of lowering the density of that improved player. This negative feedback generates detrimental long-term consequences for unrestrained growth. Using both computer simulations and evolution experiments with a nontransitive community of Escherichia coli, we find that restrained growth can evolve under conditions of limited dispersal in which negative feedback is present. This research, thus, highlights a set of ecological conditions sufficient for the evolution of one form of altruism. survival of the weakest | experimental evolution | positive assortment | ecological feedback | bacteriocin doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1100296108
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