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Oil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India

This paper investigates the optimal quota/tariff polices for China and India, two of the biggest developing countries who are facing the threat of possible oil supply disruptions, with taking into their possible interactions in the common world oil market. Our results indicate that the smaller (oil-... Full description

Journal Title: Energy Economics May 2018, Vol.72, p.255
Main Author: Zhang, Xiao-Bing
Other Authors: Zheng, Xinye , Qin, Ping , Xie, Lunyu
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
Oil
Oil
Quelle: © ProQuest LLC All rights reserved
ID: ISSN: 01409883 ; E-ISSN: 18736181
Link: http://search.proquest.com/docview/2097667435/?pq-origsite=primo
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recordid: proquest2097667435
title: Oil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India
format: Article
creator:
  • Zhang, Xiao-Bing
  • Zheng, Xinye
  • Qin, Ping
  • Xie, Lunyu
subjects:
  • China
  • India
  • Studies
  • Developing Countries–Ldcs
  • Petroleum
  • Imports
  • Tariffs
  • Oil
  • Markets
  • Energy Policy
  • Petroleum
  • Tariffs
  • Tariffs
  • Energy Policy
  • Tariff
  • International Cooperation
  • Oil
  • Security
  • Developing Countries–Ldcs
  • Developing Countries–Ldcs
  • Developing Countries–Ldcs
  • Developing Countries–Ldcs
ispartof: Energy Economics, May 2018, Vol.72, p.255
description: This paper investigates the optimal quota/tariff polices for China and India, two of the biggest developing countries who are facing the threat of possible oil supply disruptions, with taking into their possible interactions in the common world oil market. Our results indicate that the smaller (oil-importing) country may have higher incentive to free ride on the quota/tariff policy of the larger country. Besides, the optimal tariffs for the two countries would be larger in the cooperative case than those in the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the benefits of cooperation would be larger with a ‘disrupted’ market state than that with a ‘normal’ market state, which is reflective of the fact that it is more necessary and important to cooperate when the market state is worse.
language: eng
source: © ProQuest LLC All rights reserved
identifier: ISSN: 01409883 ; E-ISSN: 18736181
fulltext: fulltext
issn:
  • 01409883
  • 0140-9883
  • 18736181
  • 1873-6181
url: Link


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titleOil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India
creatorZhang, Xiao-Bing ; Zheng, Xinye ; Qin, Ping ; Xie, Lunyu
ispartofEnergy Economics, May 2018, Vol.72, p.255
identifierISSN: 01409883 ; E-ISSN: 18736181
subjectChina ; India ; Studies ; Developing Countries–Ldcs ; Petroleum ; Imports ; Tariffs ; Oil ; Markets ; Energy Policy ; Petroleum ; Tariffs ; Tariffs ; Energy Policy ; Tariff ; International Cooperation ; Oil ; Security ; Developing Countries–Ldcs ; Developing Countries–Ldcs ; Developing Countries–Ldcs ; Developing Countries–Ldcs
descriptionThis paper investigates the optimal quota/tariff polices for China and India, two of the biggest developing countries who are facing the threat of possible oil supply disruptions, with taking into their possible interactions in the common world oil market. Our results indicate that the smaller (oil-importing) country may have higher incentive to free ride on the quota/tariff policy of the larger country. Besides, the optimal tariffs for the two countries would be larger in the cooperative case than those in the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the benefits of cooperation would be larger with a ‘disrupted’ market state than that with a ‘normal’ market state, which is reflective of the fact that it is more necessary and important to cooperate when the market state is worse.
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titleOil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India
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titleOil import tariff game for energy security: The case of China and India
authorZhang, Xiao-Bing ; Zheng, Xinye ; Qin, Ping ; Xie, Lunyu
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11International Cooperation
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abstractThis paper investigates the optimal quota/tariff polices for China and India, two of the biggest developing countries who are facing the threat of possible oil supply disruptions, with taking into their possible interactions in the common world oil market. Our results indicate that the smaller (oil-importing) country may have higher incentive to free ride on the quota/tariff policy of the larger country. Besides, the optimal tariffs for the two countries would be larger in the cooperative case than those in the non-cooperative case. Moreover, the benefits of cooperation would be larger with a ‘disrupted’ market state than that with a ‘normal’ market state, which is reflective of the fact that it is more necessary and important to cooperate when the market state is worse.
copKidlington
pubElsevier Science Ltd.
urlhttp://search.proquest.com/docview/2097667435/
date2018-05-01