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Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing

In this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement techn... Full description

Journal Title: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 15 January 2018, Vol.490, pp.139-147
Main Author: Chang, Shuhua
Other Authors: Qin, Weihua , Wang, Xinyu
Format: Electronic Article Electronic Article
Language: English
Subjects:
ID: ISSN: 0378-4371 ; DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.010
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.010
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recordid: sciversesciencedirect_elsevierS0378-4371(17)30727-6
title: Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing
format: Article
creator:
  • Chang, Shuhua
  • Qin, Weihua
  • Wang, Xinyu
subjects:
  • Transboundary Pollution Game
  • Emission Permits Trading
  • Abatement Policy
  • Learning By Doing
ispartof: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 15 January 2018, Vol.490, pp.139-147
description: In this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use optimal control theory to investigate the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative games, respectively. Additionally, the effects of parameters on the results have been examined. •We involve the learning by doing in abatement into transboundary pollution game.•We investigate the optimal strategies under cooperative and noncooperative game.•The effects of parameters on the results are examined.
language: eng
source:
identifier: ISSN: 0378-4371 ; DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.010
fulltext: fulltext
issn:
  • 03784371
  • 0378-4371
url: Link


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subjectTransboundary Pollution Game ; Emission Permits Trading ; Abatement Policy ; Learning By Doing
descriptionIn this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use optimal control theory to investigate the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative games, respectively. Additionally, the effects of parameters on the results have been examined. •We involve the learning by doing in abatement into transboundary pollution game.•We investigate the optimal strategies under cooperative and noncooperative game.•The effects of parameters on the results are examined.
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abstractIn this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use optimal control theory to investigate the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative games, respectively. Additionally, the effects of parameters on the results have been examined. •We involve the learning by doing in abatement into transboundary pollution game.•We investigate the optimal strategies under cooperative and noncooperative game.•The effects of parameters on the results are examined.
pubElsevier B.V.
doi10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.010
eissn18732119
date2018-01-15