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The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments / Alberto F. Alesina, Dorian Carloni, Giampaolo Lecce

The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget deficits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we find no evidence that governments which... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 1046628976
Personen: Alesina, Alberto F.
Carloni, Dorian
Lecce, Giampaolo
Cooperations/Conferences: National Bureau of Economic Research
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: Cambridge, Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
Series: NBER working paper series (no. w17655)
Notes: December 2011
Physical Description: 1 Online-Ressource
Technische Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

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