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Regulation Versus Taxation / Alberto F. Alesina, Francesco Passarelli

We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the acti... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 1046641417
Personen: Alesina, Alberto F.
Passarelli, Francesco
Cooperations/Conferences: National Bureau of Economic Research
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: Cambridge, Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
Series: NBER working paper series (no. w16413)
Notes: September 2010
Physical Description: 1 Online-Ressource
Technische Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

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