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Bureaucrats or Politicians? / Alberto Alesina, Guido Tabellini

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical abilit... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 1046703803
Personen: Alesina, Alberto
Tabellini, Guido
Cooperations/Conferences: National Bureau of Economic Research
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: Cambridge, Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004
Series: NBER working paper series (no. w10241)
Notes: January 2004
Physical Description: 1 Online-Ressource
Technische Details: Mode of access: World Wide Web.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

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