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Knight fever : towards an economics of awards / Bruno S. Frey

Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an indivi... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 494505583
Personen: Frey, Bruno S. [VerfasserIn]
Format: Book Book
Language: English
Published: Munich, Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.], 2005
Series: CESifo working paper series Labour markets (1468)
Notes: Literaturverz. S. 35 - 38
Physical Description: 38 S

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