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Negatively correlated bandits / Nicolas Klein; Sven Rady

We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known payoff or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoffs is initially unknown. The quality of the risky arms is perfectly negative... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 623508591
Personen: Klein, Nicolas Alexandre
Rady, Sven
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: München, Univ., Volkswirtschaftl. Fak., 2008
Series: Münchener wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (2008-16)
Subjects:

Entscheidung unter Risiko / Erwartungsbildung / Gewinn / Lernen / Markov-Kette / Spieltheorie

Physical Description: Online-Ressource (27 S., 304 KB), graph. Darst.
Technische Details: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.

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