schliessen

Filtern

 

Bibliotheken

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda / Vincent Anesi; Daniel J. Seidmann

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which can be... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 715903640
Personen: Anesi, Vincent
Seidmann, Daniel J.
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: Nottingham, CEDEX, 2012
Series: CeDEx discussion paper series (2012-03)
Physical Description: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 57 S., 955,27 KB)
Technische Details: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.

Similar Items

Vorhandene Hefte/Bände

more (+)

Informationen zur Verfügbarkeit werden geladen

Staff View
LEADER 03217cam a2200457 4500
001 715903640
003 DE-627
005 20170812165312.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 120518s2012 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10419/100141  |2 hdl 
035 |a (DE-627)715903640 
035 |a (DE-599)GBV715903640 
035 |a (OCoLC)839774851 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
044 |c XA-GB 
084 |a C78  |a D71  |a D72  |2 JEL 
100 1 |a Anesi, Vincent 
245 1 0 |a Bargaining over an endogenous agenda  |c Vincent Anesi; Daniel J. Seidmann 
264 1 |a Nottingham  |b CEDEX  |c 2012 
300 |a Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 57 S., 955,27 KB) 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a CeDEx discussion paper series  |v 2012-03 
520 |a We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which can be implemented from any initial default in a pure strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and infinite policy spaces. Minimumwinning coalitions may not form, and a player who does not propose may nevertheless earn all of the surplus from agreement. The set of immovable policies (which are implemented, once reached as default) forms a weakly stable set; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. If the policy space is well ordered then the committee implements the ideal policy of the last proposer in a subset of a weakly stable set. However, this result does not generalize to other cases, allowing us to explore the effects of protocol manipulation. Variations in the quota and in the set of proposers may have surprising effects on the set of immovable policies. We also show that equilibria of our model are contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria of a related model of repeated implementation with an evolving default; and that immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form the largest consistent set. 
538 |a Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. 
700 1 |a Seidmann, Daniel J.  |d 1953-  |0 (DE-588)17048209X  |0 (DE-627)060578599  |0 (DE-576)131365967  |4 aut 
810 2 |a University of Nottingham  |b Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics  |t CEDEX discussion paper series  |v 2012-03  |9 201203000  |w (DE-627)361845138  |w (DE-576)281222428  |w (DE-600)2105636-5  |x 1749-3293 
856 4 0 |u http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/cedex-discussion-paper-2012-03.pdf  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100141  |x Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 18.05.2012  |3 Volltext 
856 7 |u 10419/100141  |2 hdl 
912 |a GBV_ILN_26 
912 |a SYSFLAG_1 
912 |a GBV_KXP 
951 |a BO 
980 |2 26  |1 01  |b 1305603311  |f K:  |d DS 175 (2012,3)  |x 0206  |y z1k  |z 18-05-12 
982 |2 26  |1 00  |8 56  |a bargaining 
982 |2 26  |1 00  |8 56  |a committee voting 
982 |2 26  |1 00  |8 56  |a evolving default 
982 |2 26  |1 00  |8 56  |a stable set