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Relational contracts with private information on the future value of the relationship : the upside of implicit downsizing costs / Matthias Fahn, Nicolas Klein

We analyze a relational contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling... Full description

PPN (Catalogue-ID): 895410850
Personen: Fahn, Matthias [VerfasserIn]
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre [VerfasserIn]
Format: eBook eBook
Language: English
Published: Munich, CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, July 2017
Series: CESifo working paper Category 11, Industrial organisation (no. 6590)
Physical Description: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten)

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